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Abstract
The experience of seeing one’s own face in a mirror is a common experience in daily life. Visual
feedback from a mirror is linked to a sense of identity. We developed a procedure that allowed
individuals to watch their own face, as in a normal mirror, or with specific distortions (lag) for active
movement or passive touch. By distorting visual feedback while the face is being observed on a
screen, we document an illusion of reduced embodiment. Participants made mouth movements,
while their forehead was touched with a pen. Visual feedback was either synchronous
(simultaneous) with reality, as in a mirror, or asynchronous (delayed). Asynchronous feedback
was exclusive to touch or movement in different conditions and incorporated both in a third
condition. Following stimulation, participants rated their perception of the face in the mirror, and
perception of their own face, on questions that tapped into agency and ownership. Results showed
that perceptions of both agency and ownership were affected by asynchrony. Effects related to
agency, in particular, were moderated by individual differences in depersonalisation and auditory
hallucination-proneness, variables with theoretical links to embodiment. The illusion presents a new
way of investigating the extent to which body representations are malleable.
Keywords
embodiment, enfacement, defacement, depersonalisation, hallucination-proneness
Our internal representation of the body is necessarily ﬂexible in order to maintain an
embodied representation of an entity that changes across time and to coordinate dynamic
body movement. The phenomenological experience of existing within an embodied whole
gives rise to a sense of ownership over the body, while the capacity to direct the body at will
is commonly described as a sense of agency. Here, we focus on the everyday experience of
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seeing one’s face in a mirror, and we introduced distortions in the visual feedback. By doing
so, we created an experience of reduced embodiment and a reduced sense of ownership and
agency. Participants reported their experience using Likert scales that measured perceived
ownership and agency. In addition, we related variability in perceived ownership and agency
to speciﬁc individual diﬀerences with theoretical links to experiences of reduced
embodiment. Illusions of embodiment demonstrate that body representation is malleable
and it can be updated to incorporate information about a novel face; this new illusion shows
that ownership and agency with respect to one’s face can also be reduced after inconsistent
visual feedback.
Illusions of Embodiment
Coordinating inputs across the senses is key to maintaining a stable body representation with
strong experiences of ownership and agency. The importance of multi-sensory input is
demonstrated in eﬀects such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI, Botvinick & Cohen, 1998)
where the embodiment of a fake hand is experienced as a result of the manipulation of visual,
tactile and proprioceptive inputs. The fake hand, suitably positioned to align with the
internal representation of the body, is touched and seen to be touched at the same time
as the real hand (hidden from view) is stimulated. The synchrony of vision, touch
and proprioception induces illusory feelings of ownership over the fake hand (Botvinick &
Cohen, 1998; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Kammers, de Vignemont, Verhagen, &
Dijkerman, 2009; Lewis & Lloyd, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and aﬀords the fake
hand the qualities of an agent (Kammers et al., 2009; Kammers, Mulder, de Vignemont, &
Dijkerman, 2010; Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Zopf, Truong, Finkbeiner, Friedman,
& Williams, 2011). Certain individual diﬀerences determine the extent of this eﬀect; for
example, positive schizotypal traits (lower level hallucinatory-type experiences) have been
related to a stronger experience of the illusion (Asai, Mao, Sugimori, & Tanno, 2011).
Manipulation of the correspondence between sensory inputs has been used to create
another type of illusion, known as enfacement (Ma, Sellaro, Lippelt, & Hommel, 2016;
Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jimee´nez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012;
Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tsakiris, 2010). Through one
procedure that brings about enfacement, participants observe another person’s face being
touched at the same time as their own face is being touched (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jime´nez, Grehl, et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jime´nez, Longo, et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2010). Through
a second procedure that brings about enfacement, participants control the movement of
another’s face through virtual reality, in addition to feeling and observing touch
(Ma et al., 2016). Unlike the RHI procedure, there is no attempt to disguise the body
part (the face) as being that of the participant. The experience is that of watching another
person’s face, not that of seeing oneself in a mirror. Nevertheless, after a brief stimulation,
participants’ recognition of their own face is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the other
face. The impact of the other face on the recognition of one’s own face can be quantiﬁed with
a self-recognition task, for example, using morphing between an image of self and of the
other individual. Participants select an image of their own face that is distorted in the
direction of the other face. Other consequences of enfacement include the implicit
updating of emotion in line with a smiling other (Ma et al., 2016) and a subsequent
tendency to conform to the behaviour of the enfaced individual (Paladino, Mazzurega,
Pavani, & Schubert, 2010). Critically, and consistent with the RHI, the visuotactile and
visuomotor stimulation must be synchronised. There are individual diﬀerences in the
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extent to which the internal representations of the face are updated through this procedure;
for example, the enfacement illusion is stronger for those who score higher for perspective
taking/empathy (Sforza et al., 2010).
The power of the enfacement illusion is surprising, given the strong familiarity that we
have with our own faces, and the fact that recognising our own face is so fundamental to our
sense of self. Humans share the ability for self-recognition in a mirror with few other species
(Gallup, 1970) – an ability observed from 18 months of age (Anderson, 1984). Self-
recognition can be impaired in dementia (Connors & Coltheart, 2011) or after a stroke,
particularly to the right hemisphere (Villarejo et al., 2011). Mirror self-recognition has also
been found to be impaired in people with schizophrenia and in their ﬁrst-degree relatives
where relationships with social cognitive functioning have also been reported (Irani et al.,
2006). Beliefs about mirror reﬂections include some systematic mistakes (Bertamini & Parks,
2005; Bertamini & Wynne, 2009; Bianchi, Savardi, & Bertamini, 2008). These deﬁcits and
errors aside, mirror reﬂections are a ubiquitous part of everyday life. In fact, identiﬁcation
with the image of our body as reﬂected in a mirror is so strong and automatic that Bertamini,
Berselli, Bode, Lawson, and Wong (2011) found no reduction in the strength of the RHI
when visual information was only available indirectly from a mirror. In this study, and
similarly to the enfacement procedure, the hand was not seen from a ﬁrst-person
perspective, but rather from a third-person perspective, albeit in the very special case of a
mirror reﬂection.
A Theoretical Account
Behind the surprising power of embodiment illusions is a manipulation of the extent to
which self and another person/object are perceived to be similar, be it in terms of physical
appearance (Bertamini et al., 2011; Bertamini & O’Sullivan, 2014; Tsakiris, Carpenter,
James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) or in terms of an enacted action
(Kammers et al., 2009, 2010; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, 2015b; Newport et al., 2010; Tsakiris,
Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Zopf et al., 2011). Bringing about similarities between individuals
plays a central role in increasing social bonds. Individuals can bond together in social in-
groups through adopting the same beliefs (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moﬃtt,
2007); individuals who coordinate their actions in a social context judge the quality of their
social interaction more favourably (interactional synchrony; Lakins & Stel, 2011);
individuals who perform similar actions in the same context judge one another’s attitudes
to be closer to one’s own (Cacioppo et al., 2014).
A recent theory that is inclusive in its approach to understanding why similarities across
self and other have a strong inﬂuence over how both are processed applies Bayesian thinking
to sensory processing and action generation (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Friston et al., 2013;
Moutoussis, Fearon, El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014). Within this framework, an
information processor develops certainties or beliefs related to the meaning attributable to
incoming events, and the meaning that will come from internally generated events. These
biases in how the processor operates allow for the generation of priors that are used in
monitoring ongoing perception and action. Individual percepts and actions are represented
along a posterior distribution of probabilities. Percepts and actions that are consistent with
priors reinforce the existence of related beliefs or certainties.
Bayesian reasoning in the context of agency is consistent with the comparator model of
agency and supported by clinical and non-clinical evidence emphasising the role of
prediction in embodied agentive self-experience (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Frith, 2005;
Miall & Wolpert, 1996; von Holst, 1954; Wegner, 2003). Action outcome predictions that
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match actual outcomes are experienced as belonging to self while mismatches
(prediction errors) are attributed to external causes. The inability to form appropriate
predictions necessary for self-other diﬀerentiation of thoughts and actions is argued to
constitute one of the core deﬁcits of schizophrenia, most clearly reﬂected in delusions of
control and hallucinations (Jeannerod, 2009; Spence et al., 1997; Woodruﬀ, 2004).
Similar processes are at play in body ownership. During the RHI, for example, the prior
includes the experience of hands: Somatosensory and visual input favour embodiment of the
rubber hand.
It is increasingly acknowledged that the sense of action/body ownership is a multifaceted
and hierarchical phenomenon, involving somatosensory signals, body schema and also
higher order intentions, goals and belief systems (Gallagher, 2000; Synofzik, Vosgerau, &
Newen, 2008). At the upper end of the information processing hierarchy, certainties that
inﬂuence more global aspects of how the self is – physical aspects might include appearance,
gait and typical walking speed; psychological aspects might include personality, beliefs and
attitudes – can be described as having more value, given their actual, or perceived, capacity
to provide meaning for events in everyday life. Deviations from a prior, or prediction errors,
could lead to context-related updating of a prior or even updating of the related belief.
The extent to which prediction errors hold such power is, however, contingent on the
value attributable to a particular belief. In the case of highly valued beliefs or certainties,
the information processor is believed to adapt to the occurrence of a prediction error in
order to negate its impact.
Experiencing another individual who is being treated similarly to self and is acting
similarly to the self matches the priors that are guiding perception of the self and self-
generated action more closely. The degree of match contributes to maintaining certainty
in the system. In the enfacement manipulation, the source contributing to maintenance of
certainty is the image of the other face being touched in the same way. Attributing higher
value to the characteristics of this face in the context of self-recognition updates the posterior
distribution towards accepting aspects of the other face. In this way, embodiment comes
about when another object or person is perceived as having a value related to an established
certainty and is therefore closer to what the self is.
An Illusion of Reduced Embodiment
If the aforementioned theory holds weight, then it should be possible to manipulate sensory
input in bringing about a distance from self and the actions that the self is enacting. Bringing
about a similarity between one’s own face and another face encourages embodiment of that
face. Here, we wanted to see whether dissimilarity between one’s own face, and a reﬂected
image of one’s own face, encourages a reduced sense of embodiment.
In the enfacement procedure described earlier, participants view another face that is
touched on the cheek in- or out-of-sync with participants’ own cheek. In our procedure,
we used a video camera so that the image on the computer screen was the face of the
participant. The image was mirror reversed so that it simulated the experience that
people have when seeing their own face in a mirror. A chin rest was used to minimise the
displacements of the head, but other movements, such as blinks and movements of the
mouth, were directly visible and provided visual feedback.
Dissimilarity between one’s own face and the viewed face was introduced in two ways.
First, the tactile perception of being touched by the experimenter was out of sync with the
visual feedback displayed on the viewed face; that is, while the participant felt that his or her
face was being touched, vision failed to conﬁrm the tactile input. Second, the proprioceptive
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experience of moving one’s lips was out of sync with the visual feedback displayed on the
viewed face; that is, while the participant was actively moving his or her lips, vision failed to
conﬁrm this proprioceptive output. We hypothesised that dissimilarity between the tactile
and proprioceptive experience of the face, on one hand, and visual feedback on the face, on
the other, would bring about defacement of one’s own face.
Hypothesised defacement was measured through questions that assessed the extent to
which participants perceived (a) ownership over the face on the screen, (b) themselves to be
the agent of the movements of the face on the screen and (c) themselves to be the agent of the
movements of their actual face. We hypothesised that asynchronous touch (tactile–vision
mismatch) and asynchronous movement (movement–vision mismatch) would reduce the
perception of owning the face on the screen (H1). With regard to participants’ perception
of agency over the face of the screen, we hypothesised that asynchronous movement
(movement–vision mismatch) would reduce perception of agency to a greater extent than
asynchronous touch, or synchrony, given that voluntary movements confer an active sense
of being an agent (H2). Related, we hypothesised that asynchronous movement might reduce
perception of ownership over the viewed face to a greater extent than asynchronous touch,
as the voluntary action of moving the mouth might confer a stronger sense of ownership
over the face than passive touch (H3). The enfacement procedure inﬂuences participants’
perception of their actual face; here, we hypothesised that the conﬂict between asynchronous
visual, tactile and proprioceptive input might result in reduced perception of agency over the
movements of one’s own face (H4).
Countering the manipulations of visual feedback would be priors seeking similarity in the
face on the monitor, with these priors being aﬀected by certainties in the extent to which the
face was embodied to begin with. The power of our manipulation to inﬂuence the posterior
distribution of the extent to which the face on the monitor was felt to be embodied would
therefore be a function of these existing priors. In order to test for an impact of pre-existing
priors on the eﬀectiveness of our manipulations, and, in so doing, to provide convergent
validity, we investigated whether measures of defacement were modulated by individual
diﬀerences. In particular, we focused on depersonalisation and proneness to auditory
hallucinations.
Depersonalisation is a cluster of phenomenological experiences that describe a self that is
physically and emotionally disconnected; a self that is embodied to a reduced extent, relative
to an average self (Medford, Sierra, Baker, & David, 2005; Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David,
2005; Simeon et al., 2008). Such experiences can be measured through questionnaire; for
example, the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (CDS; Sierra & Berrios, 2000). Keeping
with the theory set out earlier, depersonalisation might be related to priors that anticipate,
on average, a reduced sense of embodiment. If our manipulations are successful in bringing
about defacement, or reduced embodiment, then increased levels of depersonalisation should
relate to reduced perception of ownership and agency over the viewed face with
asynchronous visual feedback, in addition to reduced perception of agency over one’s
actual face (H5).
A relationship between hearing voices and depersonalisation/dissociation has been
demonstrated on the basis of shared variance in questionnaires (Kilcommons & Morrison,
2005; Perona-Garcela´n, Carrascoso-Lo´pez, et al., 2012; Perona-Garcela´n et al., 2008;
Perona-Garcela´n, Garcı´a-Montes, et al., 2012; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012), and
hallucination-proneness more generally has been related to a stronger experience of the
RHI (Asai et al., 2011). Although largely exploratory, it would be meaningful to see
whether an experimentally induced reduction in embodiment has the same eﬀect in
relation to hallucination-proneness as depersonalisation (H6), in which case it would be
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supportive of a clinically oriented hypothesis that reduced levels of embodiment underpin
hallucination-proneness (for related proposals in the context of a schizophrenia diagnosis,
see de Haan & Fuchs, 2010; Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, & Medford, 2013; Stanghellini, 2009;
Stanghellini, Ballerini, Poli, & Cutting, 2012).
Methods
Participants
Sixty young adults took part in the study (mean age¼ 21 years; 47 females and 13 males).
The sample was biased towards females, as females are over-represented in the Psychology
course from which the sample was selected. They were naı¨ve with respect to the aim of the
research and received university course credits for taking part. An internal ethics board
approved the study. Informed written consent was obtained from all participants, and the
study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
One computer was used for the visual presentation, and a second for collecting responses.
The ﬁrst computer was a Mac mini connected to a CRT monitor (screen: 37 20 cm;
resolution: 1280 1024) and to a camera positioned above and at the centre of the
monitor (Technika; webcam software: Manycam, http://manycam.com). A chin rest was
used to stabilise the head of the subjects in front of the screen at a distance of 57 cm.
We used Pure Data (http://puredata.info) to display and manipulate the incoming video
stream. The displayed scene was reversed and delay could be introduced either on the full
scene or on only the top or bottom parts of the scene. The chin rest was adjusted for each
participant to ensure that the line dividing the top and bottom parts of the scene was situated
between 2 and 4 cm above their eyebrows. In conditions where no delay was introduced,
apart from the slightly lowered direction of gaze (due to the position of the camera) and the
device’s inherent delay (60 ms), the setup allowed the participant to view their face as
though it were seen through a mirror. The second computer (screen: 34.5 19.5 cm;
resolution: 1366 768) was used to present questions following each condition, and the
individual diﬀerence questionnaires through a program written in E-Prime (http://www.
pstnet.com).
Measures of Agency and Ownership
Immediately after stimulation, participants rated their perception of the viewed face, and
their perception of their own face, on questions that tapped into ownership and agency
(see Table 1) using a 10-point Likert scale, anchored on the lower end with the statement
not at all and the upper end with the statement very much so. The questions were adapted
from those used by Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and Paladino et al. (2010). Control
questions were created in order to obtain a measure of aﬃrmative bias and were designed
to be less conceptually related to how the manipulations might aﬀect perception.
Individual Differences
At the end of the procedure, participants completed questionnaires exploring
depersonalisation and hallucination-proneness. The CDS was used to investigate the sense
of depersonalisation (Sierra & Berrios, 2000). The CDS has 29 items, and participants report
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the frequency and the duration of various sensations using a scale between 0 and 4 in
measuring frequency, and between 1 and 6 in measuring duration. We focused on one of
the ﬁve factors, Unreality-of-self, as it picks up on the core aspects of ‘physical
disconnectedness’ experienced through depersonalisation. The six questions tapping this
factor ask about experiences such as feeling like a detached observer of oneself, not quite
inside one’s own body and mechanical when moving. The widely used Launey–Slade
Hallucination Scale – Revised (LSHS-R; Bentall & Slade, 1985) was used to measure
proneness to auditory hallucinations. The questionnaire has 12 items describing
hallucinatory-type experiences. Participants report the degree to which these experiences
apply to them on a scale from 0 (certainly does not apply) to 4 (certainly applies).
Procedure
Participants were told that the aim of the study was to investigate perception of their own
face while they watched their face on a computer screen. They were asked to place their head
on a chin rest positioned in front of the screen, see Figure 1. To produce the touch
stimulation, the examiner touched the forehead 3 times in three diﬀerent locations with a
pen, whilst saying the words ‘one, two, three’ aloud at a frequency of 1.0Hz. After a
1-second gap (allowing the pattern to ﬁt within four beats), the participant repeated ‘one,
two, three’ in a similar manner also followed by a 1-second gap, watching the visual feedback
Table 1. List of Questions to Test Sense of Agency and Ownership – Category Labels
Determined Through Factor Analysis (see Factor Analysis section).
Agency Questions-viewed face
I felt as if I was causing the movement I saw
I felt as if I was controlling the movements of the face I was seeing
The face in the monitor moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my will
Whenever I moved my mouth, I expected the mouth I saw to move in the same way
Ownership Questions-viewed face
I felt as if I was looking at my own face
I felt as if the face on the monitor was my face
I felt as if the face on the monitor was part of my body
It seemed as if I were sensing the movement of my face in the location where the other face
moveda
Agency Questions-own face
I could sense the movement from somewhere between my real face and the other face
I felt as if the face in the monitor was controlling my will
I felt as if the face on the monitor was controlling my movements
It seemed as if the face I saw had a will of its own
It seemed as if I had more than one face
Affirmative bias
I felt as if my real face was turning rubbery
It appeared as if the other face was drifting towards my real facea
It felt as if I had no longer a face, as if my face had disappeared
I felt as if my real face was changing gender
I felt as if my real face was changing size
I felt as if my real face was turning metallic
I felt as if my real nose was growing
aQuestions were removed the following factor analysis.
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displayed on the screen. This call and response procedure was repeated an average of 7.5
times within each trial which lasted 60 seconds.
Participants completed four conditions diﬀering in terms of the visual information. (a) In
the Synchronous condition (S), a mirror-reversed display of the camera feed was presented
with no delay. This was similar to looking in a mirror. (b) In the Asynchronous condition,
the camera feed was shown on the whole screen with a 4-second delay (A). This meant that
action, touch and feedback were mismatched: The participant saw the pen on their forehead
in the absence of experimenter-administered stimulation and viewed their 123 movement
when no movement was being performed. (c) In the Movement Asynchronous (MA)
condition, the top part of the screen (from above the eyebrows) showed the camera feed
without delay, while the bottom part of the screen (from the eyebrows down) was presented
with a delay of 4 seconds. The stimulation was felt and seen at the same time while the 123
movement was seen in the absence of participant movement. (d) In the Touch Asynchronous
(TA) condition, the bottom part of the screen showed the camera feed without delay, while
the top part was delayed by 4 seconds. The participant saw the pen on their forehead in
the absence of experimenter-administered stimulation while their 123 movement was seen as
they performed that movement. Note that auditory information – a sensory feedback signal
that contributes to self-recognition – was not manipulated in this procedure. The order of
conditions was based on a Latin square design, with participants divided into four groups:
(a) S – MA – A – TA; (b) TA – S – MA – A; (c) A – TA – S – MA; and (d) MA – A – TA – S.
Analysis
A factor analysis was carried out on the ratings to establish whether the questions
discriminated between perceptions of agency, ownership and control/aﬃrmative bias
questions. Where possible, the experimental eﬀects and the eﬀects of individual diﬀerences
Figure 1. A photograph of the testing room showing a person sitting in front of the monitor and using the
chin rest. On the right is a scale diagram of the setup. Video clips showing the four experimental conditions
may be viewed on the following website: http://www.bertamini.org/lab/unfaithfullmirror.html.
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were analysed using analysis of variance and analysis of covariance (see Supplementary
Material for analysis of the individual questions). Ratings on 24 trials were missing due
to participants having pressed the enter key before inputted a response. The missing data
points were replaced with imputed values based on each relevant variable involved (4 agency
responses, 6 ownership and 14 control; assumed to be completely missing at random) and
calculated through taking an average from ﬁve imputed points for each individual missing
data point. No participant missed more than two questions.
Results
Factor Analysis
The aim of the factor analysis was to test whether agency, ownership and aﬃrmative bias
questions could be discriminated from one another, independently of the particular
manipulation at hand. Ratings on individual questions were collapsed across conditions,
and the 20 questions were added to a factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction,
and an oblimin rotation with Kaiser Normalisation. The analysis generated a Kaiser–
Meyer–Olkin value of .832, consistent with good factorability of the data, and Bartlett’s
Test of Sphericity was signiﬁcant, 2 (190)¼ 927.58, p< .001.
Four factors were extracted from the data on the basis of having eigenvalues over 1
(see Figure S1 for scree plot), with a goodness-of-ﬁt of 2 (116)¼ 162.75, p¼ .003.
An agency factor that tapped in perceived agency over the viewed face accounted for
39.13% of the variance in the data. An ownership factor that contained three of the
expected questions that tapped into perceived ownership over the viewed face accounted
for 11.20% of the variance. The remaining questions fell into two factors. The ﬁrst
contained six questions that we would argue tap into an aﬃrmative response bias and
accounted for 9.99% of variance. The second contained ﬁve questions that measured the
impact of the viewed face on the perception of one’s own face, with a particular focus on the
perceived agency of one’s own face. One of the aﬃrmative bias questions was removed due to
also loading on the agency factor-own face. The ownership question that was removed
loaded on both agency factors.
Experimental Effects
Data on three of the four factors were suﬃciently normally distributed, speciﬁcally Agency-
viewed face (skewness¼.391 [SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼ 1.75 [SE¼ .61]), Ownership-viewed face
(skewness¼.333 [SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼ 0.06 [SE¼ .61]), Agency-own face (skewness¼ .47
[SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼0.23 [SE¼ .61]) and not aﬃrmative bias (skewness¼ 1.35 [SE¼ .31];
kurtosis¼ 1.24 [SE¼ .61]).
A 3 4 analysis of variance of Question-TypeCondition explored the Agency-viewed
face, Ownership-viewed face and Agency-own face, as a function of the experimental
manipulations, see Figure 2. All eﬀects were signiﬁcant: Question-Type, F(2, 118)¼ 73.83,
p< .001 (2p¼ .56), Condition, F(3, 177)¼ 9.59, p< .001 (2p¼ .14), Question-
TypeCondition, F(6, 354)¼ 26.46, p< .001 (2p¼ .31).
For the Agency-viewed face questions, an eﬀect of Condition was signiﬁcant, F(3, 177)¼
25.82, p< .001 (2p¼ .30). Perceived agency of the viewed face did not diﬀer between A and
MA (p¼ 910; A:M¼ 4.39, SD¼ 2.21; MA:M¼ 4.35, SD¼ 2.18). Asynchronous movement
(A and MA) signiﬁcantly reduced perceived agency relative to S, t(59)¼ 7.94, p< .001;
M¼ 7.01, SD¼ 2.20, and TA, t(59)¼ 2.83, p¼ .006; M¼ 5.33, SD¼ 2.20. However,
asynchronous touch (TA) itself reduced perceived agency relative to synchronous touch
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and synchronous movement, S, t(59)¼ 5.37, p< .001. Comparisons are signiﬁcant at a
corrected p value of .013.
For the Ownership-viewed face questions, an eﬀect of Condition was signiﬁcant, F(3,
177)¼ 10.40, p< .001 (2p¼ .15). Perceived ownership over the viewed face did not diﬀer
between A and MA (p¼ .178; A: M¼ 5.41, SD¼ 2.25; MA: M¼ 5.09, SD¼ 2.54).
Asynchronous movement (A and MA) signiﬁcantly reduced perceived ownership relative
to S (M¼ 6.66, SD¼ 2.10), t(59)¼ 4.31, p< .001. The drop in perceived ownership between
asynchronous movement (A and MA) and Asynchronous Touch (TA) did not reach
signiﬁcance at the corrected threshold, t(59)¼ 2.29, p¼ .025. Asynchronous touch (TA)
itself (M¼ 5.85. SD¼ 2.08) reduced perceived ownership relative to synchronous touch
and synchronous movement (S), t(59)¼ 3.01, p¼ .004. Comparisons are signiﬁcant at a
corrected p value of .013.
For the Agency-own face questions, an eﬀect of Condition was signiﬁcant, F(3,
177)¼ 26.55, p< .001 (2p¼ .31). Perceived agency of one’s own face did not diﬀer
between A and MA (p¼ .528; A: M¼ 3.23, SD¼ 2.18; MA: M¼ 3.09, SD¼ 2.10).
Asynchronous movement (A and MA) signiﬁcantly reduced perceived agency relative to
S, t(59)¼ 8.09, p< .001; M¼ 1.45, SD¼ 1.57. The drop in perceived agency between
asynchronous movement (A and MA) and Asynchronous Touch (TA) did not reach
signiﬁcance at the corrected threshold, M¼ 2.73, SD¼ 1.98; t(59)¼ 2.33, p¼ .023.
Asynchronous touch (TA) also reduced perceived agency relative to synchronous touch
and synchronous movement, S, t(59)¼ 5.37, p< .001. Comparisons are signiﬁcant at a
corrected p value of .013.
Data for the aﬃrmative bias questions were not normally distributed (skewness¼ 1.35
[SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼ 1.24 [SE¼ .61]), calling for non-parametric tests. Wilcoxon signed-
rank tests revealed that scoring in conditions that introduced asynchrony contributed to
an aﬃrmative response bias over scoring in the Synchronous condition (TA [Mdn¼ .67,
IQR¼ 2.29] vs. S [Mdn¼ .42, IQR¼ 1.50]; Z¼ 734.50, p¼ .002; MA [Mdn¼ .50,
IQR¼ 2.17] vs. S; Z¼ 551.00, p¼ .009; A [Mdn¼ .33, IQR¼ 1.83] vs. S; Z¼ 520.50,
p¼ .029).
Figure 2. Responses to the questions across all four conditions. S¼ Synchronous, TA¼Touch
Asynchronous, MA¼Movement Asynchronous, A¼Asynchronous. Error bars are 1 SEM.
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Individual Difference Effects
Unreality-of-self from the CDS scale was related to LSHS, rs(59)¼ .386, p¼ .002. LSHS
scores were normally distributed (skewness¼.056 [SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼.816 [SE¼ .61]),
allowing for hallucination-proneness to be included in subsequent analyses as a continuous
variable. Skewness and kurtosis of the Unreality-of-self variable were problematic
(skewness¼ 1.17 [SE¼ .31]; kurtosis¼ 1.45 [SE¼ .61]); therefore, the ratings were split at
the median to generate groups: those scoring above the median on Unreality-of-self and
those scoring below.
In the Agency-viewed face data, both Unreality-of-self and LSHS interacted with
Condition, F(3, 171)¼ 3.17, p¼ .026 (2p¼ .05) and F(3, 171)¼ 4.50, p¼ .005 (2p¼ .07),
respectively. When the movement alone was asynchronous (MA), the high Unreality-of-
self group (M¼ 3.92, SD¼ 1.54) scored signiﬁcantly lower on perceived agency relative to
the low Unreality-of-self group (M¼ 4.79, SD¼ 2.63), F(1, 57)¼ 8.48, p¼ .005 (2p¼ .13), see
Figure 3. LSHS was also related to perceived agency when the movement alone was
asynchronous (MA); however, the direction of the eﬀect was in the opposite direction,
with increasing LSHS scores being related to an increased perception of agency,
r(57)¼ .380, p¼ .003, see Figure 4. Neither Unreality-of-self nor LSHS were related to
perceived agency in the remaining conditions (Unreality-of-self, S, p¼ .515, TA, p¼ .771,
A, p¼ .322; LSHS, S, p¼ .784, TA, p¼ .629, A, p¼ .243).
In the Ownership-viewed face data, Condition failed to interact with Unreality-of-self
and hallucination-proneness (ps> .2). There was a main eﬀect of Unreality-of-self, with
the high group generally rating ownership over the viewed face lower than the low
group, F(1, 57)¼ 4.33, p¼ .042 (2p¼ .07; high, M¼ 6.23, SD¼ 1.93; low, M¼ 5.28,
SD¼ 1.41). Likewise, in the Agency-own face data, condition failed to interact with
Unreality-of-self and hallucination-proneness (ps> .3). The high Unreality-of-self group
tended to rate questions more highly than the low group, although this was not
signiﬁcant, F(1, 57)¼ 3.80, p¼ .056 (2p¼ .06; high, M¼ 3.06, SD¼ 1.75; low, M¼ 2.20,
SD¼ 1.47).
Figure 3. Responses to the questions across the four conditions for both the high and low Unreality-of-self
(depersonalisation) groups. Error bars are SEM for each group across conditions.
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Independent-samples median tests contrasting high and low Unreality-of-self groups on
the aﬃrmation bias questions in each condition revealed no diﬀerences (ps> .07). Partial
correlations (controlling for Unreality-of-self) found no relationship between LSHS and
scoring on these questions (ps .16).
The opposing relationships between LSHS, Unreality-of-self, and perceived agency
over the viewed face with asynchronous movement was unexpected, and meant that, in
the relationship to perceived agency in this paradigm, LSHS was acting as a suppressor of
the reduction of perceived agency over the viewed face when the movement was
asynchronous. As a more concrete demonstration of this, the relationship between
Unreality-of-self and perceived agency over the viewed face when the movement was
asynchronous was signiﬁcantly lower when variance shared with LSHS was not removed,
rs(59)¼.219, p¼ .093, relative to when it was removed, rs(59)¼.373, p¼ .003; Z¼ 3.14,
p¼ .001.
Discussion
The principal aim here was to test whether it would be possible to bring about reduced levels
of embodiment through introducing a temporal discrepancy in the multi-sensory alignment
of sensed touch, movement and vision. Participants observed their face on a monitor being
touched while they mouthed a sequence of digits. In one condition, visual feedback was
synchronous with tactile input and proprioceptive output, whilst in another, visual feedback
was asynchronous with both tactile input and proprioceptive output. In two remaining
conditions, asynchrony was limited to either a visual–tactile mismatch or a visual–
proprioceptive mismatch. The procedure was successful in bringing about reduced feelings
of embodiment, as measured in questions that tapped perceptions of agency and ownership
over the face on the screen and agency over one’s own face. Individual diﬀerences moderated
the resultant eﬀects, providing convergent validity.
Figure 4. Movement Asynchronous only condition (MA), the relationship between hallucination-
proneness (LSHS) and perceived agency over the viewed face is on the left; the relationship between
hallucination-proneness and perceived ownership over the viewed face is on the right, with least square lines
of the best fit.
12 Perception 0(0)
Experimental Effects
When visual feedback from the face was asynchronous with either, or both, tactile input and
proprioceptive output, participants perceived a reduced sense of ownership over the face on
the screen (H1). The face on the monitor was still the face of the individual participant; yet,
the introduction of visual prediction errors through the mismatch between visual feedback
on the face, on one hand, and tactile or proprioceptive experience of one’s actual face, on the
other, distanced the face on the monitor, making it feel less owned. Likewise, asynchrony
between visual feedback and proprioceptive experience, in particular, reduced participants’
perception of being the agent of the movements enacted by the face on the screen (H2). The
movements of the mouth on the monitor did match those of individual participants;
however, the temporal separation of proprioceptive experience of making the movements,
and visual feedback on the movements taking place, reduced participants’ feeling that they
were in control of the movements on the screen.
In addition to bringing about a reduced sense of embodying the face on the screen,
the manipulations also aﬀected participants’ experience of being an agent over their actual
face (H4). This ﬁnding makes sense from the perspective that participants had embodied the
face on the monitor to some extent. The visual prediction errors must have been forcing an
update, bottom-up driven, to proprioceptive control, which conﬂicted with participants’ top-
down control over mouth movement, bringing about the reduced sense of being an agent
over one’s own movements.
It is unclear from this study the extent to which reducing multi-sensory alignment aﬀects
one’s actual capacity to act. For example, could defacement aﬀect speech quality? Could de-
armment aﬀect the precision with which an action is being completed? Could de-footment
interfere with one’s capacity to walk? Likewise, it is unclear whether reducing multi-sensory
alignment aﬀects one’s actual ownership of a body part. For example, could defacement make
one feel that speech output which is actually theirs belongs to someone else? Could de-armment
or -footment make one feel that someone else is controlling the arm or foot’s actions? Further
manipulations of the procedure introduced here would allow such questions to be addressed, in
addition to the use of more objective measures, such as Electromyography (EMG).
As they stand, the ﬁndings are consistent with a Bayesian view of information processing.
Our perception of self is stabilised by distributions of probabilities, deﬁned by entropies/
beliefs, that can be shifted through prediction error; however, in relation to beliefs of
stronger value, such as the extent to which I feel ownership over my own face or the
extent to which I feel an agent of face moment, prediction error can be negated. The
extent to which prediction error can be negated is dependent on the priors, as conﬁrmed
in the individual diﬀerence data given later.
Individual Differences
Mapping on to the phenomenological content of the Unreality-of-self questions, we expected
that asynchrony across vision, touch and proprioception would have a larger impact on
individuals with higher Unreality-of-self scores (H5). The results showed that, speciﬁcally,
when there was a mismatch between visual feedback on the face and proprioceptive output,
higherUnreality-of-self scores were related to an increased perception of having lost agency over
the face on the screen. Individuals prone to depersonalisation may have priors of reduced
certainty/entropy corresponding to the representation of body parts/the body whole. Such a
distribution would be more likely to update following prediction error, which, in the context of
themanipulation, led to amore noticeable diﬀerence in the perceived agency over the face on the
screen with increasing Unreality-of-self scores. Perhaps consistent with less stable priors,
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Unreality-of-self was related to a general reduction in the extent towhich the face on themonitor
felt owned, indicative of reductions in the baseline embodiment.
A relationship between Unreality-of-self scores and reduced perception of agency failed to
reach signiﬁcance when visual feedback on tactile input, in addition to proprioceptive output,
was asynchronous. Perhaps the temporal alignment between visual feedback on touch and
proprioception, when there were visual–touch and visual–proprioceptive mismatches,
maintained a sense of agency over the face, even if delayed, as opposed to when there was
temporal misalignment between visual feedback on touch and proprioception.
We had considered a simplistic hypothesis that a state of reduced embodiment connected
with depersonalisation causes hallucinatory experiences (H6). However, the surprising
ﬁnding was that auditory hallucination-proneness did not match depersonalisation
(Unreality-of-self) in its relationship to perception of agency. Instead, those scoring higher
on hallucination-proneness were less likely than average to report reduced agency with
visually asynchronous mouth movement. A reduced tendency to report that one’s sense of
agency is being aﬀected by asynchronous multi-sensory input could stem from two, although
perhaps not mutually exclusive, sources.
We have made a theoretical connection between a trait tendency towards reduced
embodiment (depersonalisation) and a tendency to be aﬀected by asynchronous multi-
sensory input. Increased or hyper-embodiment may be related to a reduced tendency to be
aﬀected by asynchronous multi-sensory input: Any temporal discrepancy might be
compensated for more rapidly, reducing the impact of asynchronous input on perception
and awareness. Hallucination-proneness may diﬀer from depersonalisation in being related
to priors of increased certainty, being more likely to negate prediction errors requiring an
update to the distribution. Consistent with this argument, hallucination-proneness is related to
a tendency to attribute the outcomes of actions carried out under uncertainty to another agent,
as opposed to being self-generated (de Bezenac, Sluming, O’Sullivan, & Corcoran, 2015).
Alternatively, as argued more globally in the schizophrenia literature (e.g. Sass & Parnas,
2003), hallucination-proneness might be related to hyper-reﬂexivity: In this case, hyper-
reﬂexivity towards tracking conscious movement. Such hyper-reﬂexivity might, in subjective
measures at least, compensate for reduced embodiment, negating an awareness of asynchrony
in multi-sensory input. This latter account is consistent with the argument that subconscious
attempts to restore multi-sensory integration in the face of perceptual mechanisms that fail to
generate multi-sensory integration play a causative role in producing hallucinated content
(Postmes et al., 2014). Such restorative eﬀorts might generate hyper-embodied representations
that are less aﬀected by perceptual errors in multi-sensory input (see also Fuchs, 2010). And so,
reduced embodiment, in combination with hyper-reﬂexivity, might account for the decreased
tendency to feel aﬀected by asynchronous multi-sensory input observed here. Postulating aside,
there does seem to be some relationship between embodiment, and both depersonalisation and
hallucination-proneness, worthy of further investigation. In the context of the current study,
suﬃce it to say that the modulatory eﬀects of individual diﬀerences on speciﬁc conditions are
consistent with the manipulations impacting on perception of agency.
Limitations and Further Research
Participants tended to score higher on the aﬃrmative bias/control questions in the
Asynchronous conditions. It is possible that this arose either because participants found it
diﬃcult to label accurately the altered experience brought about by these manipulations or
because of a bias towards higher responding generally following asynchronous stimulation.
Nevertheless, the factor analysis was able to separate variance on the bias questions from
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variance in the remaining questions, consistent with the ownership and agency questions
measuring true perceptions of ownership and agency.
Participants rated their perceived agency over the viewed face, in addition to their own
face, lower with asynchronous touch alone, as opposed to when the actual and viewed faces
were in synchrony. We had not predicted that perception of agency would be aﬀected by
asynchronous touch (H2 and H4). However, proprioceptive representations are themselves
inﬂuenced by inputs from other senses; thus it is feasible for a mismatch between vision and
touch to aﬀect proprioception and consequently perceived agency.
Finally, we had reasoned that a mismatch between vision and proprioception would have a
stronger impact on perception of ownership than a mismatch between vision and touch.
Perceptions of owning the viewed face were more reduced following the asynchronous
movement, as opposed to asynchronous touch; however, the diﬀerence did not survive
correction for multiple comparisons. This is a limitation in the study. Participants’
experiences of reduced embodiment were measured subjectively. The predictable diﬀerences
on ownership and agency found across conditions, as well as the predicted individual
diﬀerence eﬀect with depersonalisation, provide credibility in the illusion; however, an
objective measure would substantiate the procedure’s capacity to bring about reduced
embodiment, and would test the source of the underlying mechanisms behind individual
diﬀerences in performance. Another follow-up to the procedure could involve replacing one’s
own face with another face, investigating to what extent asynchrony across faces reduces
embodiment of characteristics of the other; for example, characteristics of their face, which
would be the reverse of the enfacement procedure. Future studies could also manipulate the
characteristics of spoken output, taking advantage of its rich source of information for self-
recognition (Zheng, MacDonald, Munhall, & Johnsrude, 2011).
Illusions of embodiment measure the extent to which external objects become
integrated in internal representations of the body. This is conceptually diﬀerent to what is
measured during an illusion of reduced embodiment. In such an illusion, variance relates to
the extent to which individuals become disconnected from their body. Intuitively one would
predict an increased tendency to disconnect from the body would be related to ﬂexible body
representations that are easily updateable. Likewise the converse: A reduced tendency to
disconnect from the body would be related to less ﬂexible body representations that are less
easily updateable. Synchronous sensory input oﬀers a route through which the ﬂexibility of
body representations can be measured; asynchrony oﬀers a route through which
disconnection from the body can be measured. Both types of illusion provide avenues to
study clinically related, often distressing, experiences that are currently poorly understood.
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